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ABSTRACT
Certain aspects of political functioning are investigated through the use
of mathematical systems analysis techniques. Formal relationships are
developed with respect to some of the elementary functions involved in
politics. These relationships involve society and the political system
in terms of demands, decisions and stress = Further, the concepts of
communications and specialization are introduced as means of enhancing
the ability of the political system to make satisfying decisions. The
functioning of the system is analyzed in its steady state and a com-
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1. Introduction.
An eiiterprise oi' thought which is stiii continuing today is to develop
a theory of politics. The purpose behind such a theory is to better under-
stand what politics is and what actually occurs within the sphere of politics.
Several attempts have been made toward this end, notably the works of Karl
W. Deutsch, Gabriel Almond & James Coleman and David Easton to mention
only a few. '
Such a theory of politics as Karl Duetsch suggests, "should develop
appropriate analytic concepts and models. . . "2 in recent years political
scientists have sought to interpret politics in terms of key analytic concepts,
and several approaches have been made, ranging from area studies to sys-
tems analysis. For an idea of the quantity and variety of^ such attempts see,
Roy C, Macrides and Bernaro E. Brown's "Comparative Politics - Notes and
3Readings" In this work the authors present the reader with several com-
parative studies which offer a comphensive run of the field.
David Easton has argued that a general empirically oriented theory
was the "most economical way in the long run to understand political life".
Deutsch, K.W. The Nerves of Government. The Free Press of Glencoe,
1963. Almond, G.A, and Coleman, J. S. The Politics of the Developing
Area
s
, Princeton University Press, I960. Easton, D. A Systems Analysis
of Political Life . John Wiley & Sons, 1965.
^Deutsch, op. cite . p. vii.
"•Macridis, R. C. and Brown, BE, Comparative Politics, Notes and
Readings . The Dorsey Press, 1964c
^Easton, D. The analysis of Political Systems. Comparative Politics >
ed. Macridis, R.C. and Brown, B.E. The Dorsey Press, 1964. p. 89.
In an attempt toward such a type of theory, David Easton turned toward
viewing politics and political life in terms of systems analysis. ^ In this
thesis the author has attempted to extend the systems analysis type approach
toward studying politics to include mathematical expressions denoting inter-
relationships between the systems involved. It is hoped that the basic
mathematical approach followed in this thesis might offer greater insight
into the complex concepts of political functioning
o
Prior to expressing any mathematical relationships it will first be
necessary to describe the overall system to be considered in this thesis
and then to study more closely the various parts which comprise the systemo
Thus, this thesis will be divided into two main portions, the first being
primarly concerned with the broad view of political life as a system, while
the second will consist of a more detailed account of the components of
such a system, paying particular attention to mathematical formulations.
lo Politics as a System,
David Easton defines a system as "any set of variabiles regardless
of the degree of interrelationship amoung them, " This definition was
chosen to free the reader "from the need to agree about whether a political
system is or is not really a system. ' The only question of importance,
states Easton, is whether the set of variables selected as a system helps
^Easton, D. A Systems Analysis .of Political Life
. John Wiley & Sons,
1965o
^Ibido , p. 21.
us "to understand and explain some aspect of human behavior of concern
7
to USo
For purposes of instruction, a political system will be defined here
to be that system of interactions through which order is maintained in the
society. In other words, the political system is assumed to behave as if
it desires to maintain order in that societyo One way in which the political
system can help to maintain this order is by satisfying the people to whom
it is responsible. That is, by effectively satisfying certain demands which
the people make on the political system. Of course, the political system
performs other functions, but the satisfaction of the people will be the
primary role which is considered here. For a broader concept of the role
of the political system see the introduction to Almond and Coleman's "The
p
Politics of the Developing Areas. '
Now once we speak of the political processes in political life as a
system, certain consequences fblloWo As Easton Suggests: "The very idea
of a system suggests that we can separate political life from the rest of
social activity. . . " and exajnine it as though it were a "self contained
entity" surrounded by the enviroment in which it operates, Easton divides
this enviroment into two parts, namly what he calls "intra societal" and
g
the "extra sociental, " Generally the "intra societal" part consists of




^Almond, op. cito . pp, 5-26,
°Easton, op, cit. . pp, 21-22.
in the latter. In a society, the systems, including the political system,
constitute a source of influences that have direct bearing on the condition
under which the political system operates. The "extra societal" part con-
sists of those systems that lie outside the society„ This thesis will be
restricted to the intra societal aspects -that is, the environment within
which the political system must function, will^in this analysis^ consist only
of systems which are a part of the society. Further.the political system
will be considered as a component of this society..
2o 1 Political System.
It will be convenient to look upon the political system as having
inputs and outputs. In order for this concept to have any meaning it is
necessary that the political system have boundaries, in much the same sense
as a physical system. This boundary may be considered as the points where
other systems in the environment end and the political system begins. To
illustrate, consider the situation where certain members of the society are
muttering protests concerning the manner in which taxes are apportioned.
Now these mutterings do not become a part of the political system until
they are actually heard by members of the political system or until they are
"witnessed", as would be the case if violence or riots were to result from
such unresto With this in mind we can now view the political system as
it is shown in Figure I.
Since we have defined the political system to be separate from the
rest of the social systems and since we have restricted our environment to












to the environment as the society, where society includes ail social systems
except the political system. Thus, Figure 1 may be modified somewhat so









SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The inputs are converted by the processes of the political system
into outputs which, in turn, have consequences both for the political system
and society. In order to understand the functioning of the political system
it is necessary to identify these inputs and the factors which affect them,
to trace the conversion process whereby inputs are converted to outputs
within the system, and to relate these outputs with succeeding inputs into
11
the political systenio
At this point it should be pointed out that this thesis will be concerned
only with the "short run" view of the functioning of the political systeirio In
other words, the analysis of major processes which promote social change
wili not be considered. In restricting the analysis to the "short run" the
political system may be thought of in terms of classic mechanistic equili-
brium, where the system receives disturbances from its environment. If
such disturbances are small, the equilibrium will be restored through the
action of the system, whereas if the disturbance is too large then general
lapse of the system will result. Karl Deutsch treats this concept in more
detail in "The Nerves of Government". ^
From Figure 2 it is seen that whatever disturbances are to affect the
political system must necessarily come from the society. In other words
the inputs to the system contain these disturbanceso Further, it is assumed
here that all such disturbances tend to hinder the viability of the system.
David Easton considers disturbances to also include those disturbances
which are favorable with respect to the persistance of the system. ^..
In this thesis, it will be convenient to view any favorable disturbances not
as something which the system responds to, but rather as something which
increases its capability to effectively handle the unfavorable influences.
This allows us to stay within the mechanistic equilibrium concept, for if





we allowed favorable disturbances, the system would not react to such
disturbances so as to return to its initial state. Rather it would seek some
higher state.
Now among the inputs to the political system it is postulated that
there are two basic kinds: demands and stress. The outputs will consist
primarily of decisions made by the political system in response to the inputs
it observes o The only decisions to be considered will be those brought about
by demands and stress. Of course^ other type decisions are possible. As
Deutsch points out, the political system^ in addition to responding to specific
demands^ may also assume a generalized leadership role. ^^ That is, the
political system assumes responsibility far beyond a particular decision.
This leads into a long run analysis which, as mentioned earlier, will not
be pursued in this thesis.
The concepts of demands, decisions and stress will now be considered
is somewhat greater detail.
2o 1. 1 Demands o
The author agrees with Easton's assertion that the reason a political
system comes into a society is that demands are being made by persons or
groups which cannot all be satisfiedo In all societies it can be assumed
that scarcity prevails with regard to those things which are considered to
be of value. In pursuing these valued items, disagreement between persons
resulting from conflicting means of attaining such items can sometimes be
12 Deutsch, OP. cito , p, 118,
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resolved by the persons involved. In other cases, however the affair must
be settled authoritatively through some sort of organized procedures. When
a specific disagreement requires these organized procedures for settlement
we say that from this disagreement demands are placed on the political
system.
These demands may come from several different sources. For instance
there are demands concerning religion, demands concerning ecology and
demands concerning the economyo This is not an exhaustive list, but it
does offer some insight into the complexity of the problem of how and why
demands are generated. The specific sources of each demand represent
quite an extensive list and it will not be attempted to define each of these
sources. It will be assumed, however, that all demands emanate from the
society and that none actually are bom within the political system.
As implied earlier, a demand must be "heard" or "witnessed" by the
political system if any effective action is to be taken. That is, there must
be some means whereby demands are effectively carried through the boun-
daries of the political system. The method by which demands are introduced
into the political system is dependent upon several factors » Perhaps the
most important system affecting a demand's successful penetration of the
political system's boundary is that of communications. The importance of
communications has been given great support by Deutschl^ and Lucean Pye
who devoted an entire book toward analyzing political development in terms
^^Ibid. pp. 145-162.
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of communications. ''^ As Pye points out in his introduction, there is a
"peculiarly intimate relationship between the political process and the
communications process o " The communication process of course plays an
equally important role for decisions penetrating the boundary of society.
In the initial formulation, the communications system will be assumed to
be ideal - that is, all demands emanating from society do indeed penetrate
the boundary of the political system, while all decisions issued by the
political system effectively "reach" the society. Later, this assumption
will be altered to allow for a communications system which is something
less than ideal.
The importance of demands as an input to the political system cannot
be emphasized enough. In this thesis, it is this input which the system
requires in order to operate. The other input, stress, will be discussed




Almond and Coleman refer to the output functions of a political system
1 fi
to be "rule making", "rule application", and "rule adjudication". Without
going into the specific meanings of each of these functions it suffices, to
say that they all represent some sort of decision. As implied in the dis-
cussion thus far, the type of decision is primarily dependent upon the type
14
Pye, L.W, Politics, Personality, and Nation Buildinq o Yale University
Press, 1962
l^ibido p. 6.
^^Almond, op. cit. , pp„ 52-58.
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of demand which it is in reference to. For instance, a decision concerning
education may involve making a rule, applying this rule through some means
and stating that not adhering to such a rule is in fact, illegal.
Earlier we assumed that the political system behaved as if it desired
to maintain order in the society. One of the major ways of preventing dis-
order is to keep everyone in the society satisfied. Thus^ the political
system can help to maintain order by providing decisions that tend to satisfy
the demands of the members of the society. It is the responsibility of the
political system to match the outputs of decisions with inputs of demand.
Carl Eriadeick discusses order at great length in "Man and His Government"
and he even considers the benefits which may be realized by purposely
1 7
creating disorder. ' This aspect of the problem, however, will not be con-
sidered here. Two factors which aid in giving better quality and/or satis-
faction to decisions will be considered in this thesis. One, is the quality
of the communications available and the other is the amount of differentation
within the political systemo The first idea is discussed above. The second
concept is now presentedo
Several authors '° refer to the concept of differentation within the
1
7
Friedrich, G.J. Man and His Government. McGraw-Hill, 1963.
ppo 335-350.
'•°See especially; LaPalombara, J. Bureaucracy and Political Development:
Notes, Queries and Dilemmas. Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed.
LaPalombara, J. Princeton University Press, 1963o pp. 34-61. Diesing, P.
Reason in Society . University of Illinois Press, 1962o pp. 169-190. Also
Friedrich and Almond discuss the concept in their books.
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political system. Paul Diesing claims that any decision making structure
must have as one of its characteristics, differentiation, if it is to exist at
19
all. This decision making structure, or political system as used here,
must "make possible the presentation of a plurality of parts, values, norms
and action alternatives". ^^ He claims that at least two of each one of
these is necessary, otherwise no decision would be possible because there
would be no alternatives „ This is known as differentiation. As differentia-
tion is used to a greater degree, the decisions emanating from the political
system will be improved. As used in this thesis, differentration is directly
related with complexity. Complexity refers to the number of different offices
and functions within the political system. It is posulated that as complexity
increases, the presentation of more plurality of facts, values^ norms and
action alternatives, and hense higher differentration, will follow. One
may also view differentration of offices as a special instance of the universal
7 1law of division of labor as developed by sociology and economies.
As an example of how complexity would be of benefit in yielding a
more satisfying decision consider a demand concerning farm price supports
o
Now for a decision concerning farm price supports to have any value it will
be necessary to consider a wide variety of factors; facts about costs, pro-
duction, voting patteijns, etc. Omission of any specific factor could lead
to a poor decision yielding results which had heretofore been unanticipated.
^^Diesing, op. cit.
. pp. 177-190 =
20lbid. p. 177.
^Ipriedrich. op. cit. , p. 47 Oo
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For decisions to be effective they must be followed by the members
of the society for whom they are intendedo This brings up the question of
the authority of the political system to impose its decisions upon society.
Easton suggests that authority is a special power relationship based on the
expectation that if the political system makes a decision the members of
society will adapt this decision as "the premise" of their own behavior. ^^
Carl Friedrich considers the power inherent in authority is likely to be a
consensual power. ^^ In the political system described in this analysis it
is assumed that the members of the political system have a right to command
and the other members of society a duty to obey. There do exist, however,
other sources of power to supplement this kind of power which is "understood".
We will refer to this supplementing power as enforcemento That a political
system must resort to enforcement is an indication that the members of
society are less than satisfied with the decisions made by the political system.
2.1.3 Stress.
The final concept to be considered in this analysis is that of stress.
To better understand this concept, recall that the primary function of the
political system, as defined in this thesis, is to maintain order within
society. This is done by making satisfactory decisions with respect to the
demands placed on the system. When the ability of the political system to








Ideally the. political system seeks aLSityatioru in which there is no stress. (j(r^ \y
Stress results from tl^^disturbances placed on the system, which in ^
the model considered here, are the demands emanating from members outside
the political system. If the demands are satisfactorly answered through
proper decisions then the political system may be viewed as having success-V
fully responded to the disturbances and has returned to the equilibrium
position of zero stress. If, on the other hand, the political system did not
respond so successfully to disturbances placed on it, then it would be under
stress. i
If the amount of stress reached a point where the political system
could no longer maintain order through its decision making capability it
would collapse for want of a system which could perform this function. This
level of stress will be referred to as the critical level
o
Up to this point politics has been considered as a system and the
methodology of systems analytic techniques have been employed to facili-
tate some of the basic interrelationships of the political system with its
environment. The functional relationships existing between the political
system and its environment have been expressed in general terms in order
to offer the reader some insight into the factors which are considered relevant
Having laid the ground work^ it will now be attempted to express these in-




For expository reasons, the model will develop in stages whereby
concepts are introduced separately. The first such concept will be that
of stress as it is related to demands and decisions o Once this relation-
ship has been defined, the other concepts discussed in section 2 will be
added.
In order to better understand the analysis to follow it will be conven-
ient to make use of flow diagrams. The first such diagram is depicted in









SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (MODIFIED )
the political system as two distinct "black boxes", we may regard these
"black boxes" as devices for converting inputs into certain outputs. That
is, demands are transformed into decisions, which are fed back to society
where they are somehow transformed into stress. This idea of "feed back"
will be followed throughout the analysis.
20
3. 1 Stress.
In order to express stress as some function of demands and decisions,
volumes of demands and decisions will be considered. Deutsch and Easton
94both write of the actual measuring of these factorso ^^ Now, when speaking
of volume of- . demands it will be convenient to refer to demands byty^. For
example., fifty persons may each place a demand on the government, but if
all these damands are of the same type then the political system observes
a volume of only one demand. A spokesman for a group of persons actually
aggregates several similar demands and takes it through the boundary of
the political system as one demando If we consider stress to be proportional
to the difference between the number of demands and satisfactory decisions
concerning these demands, the discussion can be preaerited symbolically in
the following manner:
S^ - total stress due to unsatisfied demands at time t
D^_j^ - volume of demands by type the political system
observes during a unit time interval
D /
-ii
- volume of decisions which satisfied demands
during unit time interval.
^l-l - stress which existed at the beginning of the time
interval in question.
B - proportionality constant-stress/unsatisfied demands
where the units of stress are arbitrary.
Then S^ = B(D^^.^ - D^^..^^) + S^_^ (l)
^'^Deutsch, op. cit.
.
pp 125-126 and Easton, op. cit .. dp. 61-64.
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The proportionality constant, B, is assumed to be positive since it is postu-
lated that stress increases as the difference between demands and decisions
increase.
Stress is expressed in terms of a difference equation to facilitate
expressing the argument verbally. To manipulate this and other equations
to follow, however, it will be convenient to do so in terms of continuous
differential equations. This technique should offer no loss of generality
in the analysis. Thus, re-arranging equation (1) as:
St - Vl = 2<°t-l - DsCt-l)' <2)
the analogous differential equation may be expressed as:
^ = B(D - D.) (3)
Dt ^
For reasons of analysis it is assumed that demands and satisfying
decisions vary sinusoidally with time. Further, it is postulated that there
exists a lag between the time when demands are first introduced into polit-
ical system and the political systems converts such demands into satisfying
decisions o This time lag will be denoted as Tand will be assumed to be
fixed. For simplicity, the frequency with which demands enter the p61itical
system will be assumed equal to the frequency with which decisions are
issued from the political system. Thus:
D = D^ sin W t (4)
where D-^ = maximum number of demands entering the political system during
some time period T. Let
Dg = Dg^ sinW (t-r) (5)
22
where D<, is the maximum mumber of satisfying decisions coming from the
^1
political system.
^ = B (D^ sin Wt - Dg^ sin W(t -*r))
To solve for S, we integrate both sides of equation (7) yielding
BDi BDg,
S(t) = - -i-l' cos Wt + ^ GO& W(t -t ) + ^W W
(6)
(7)
where C is the constant of integration. For convenience, let stress, at
time T = be
, V BDi BDe r^
W w




W cos Wt +
BDsij
W co3W(t -T)
Figure 4 is a plot of stress as a function of time. Superimposed on
this plot are demands and decisions plotted as a function of time. The
maximum number of satisfying decisions, D„, was chosen to be less than
1
the maximum number of demands D.
FIGURE 4
PLOT OF STRESS, DEMANDS AND DECISIONS
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Referring to figure 4 we see that the rate of stress increases when
demands exceed decisions and decreases when the opposite is true. For
some time period it is quite possible that satisfying decisions would exceed
demands. This is best illustrated through an example. If in time period 1
five demands were placed on the political system and during that time period
only two satisfying decisions were made, the stress rate during that time
period would be increasing. Now consider the next time period where only
two demands were made. It is conceivable that during this time period the
political system might make three satisfying decisions, one with respect
to the previous time period and two with respect to the second time period.
In this case decisions would exceed demands and the rate of stress would
decrease„ The time period is chosen arbitrarily as one unit where, for
example, this unit could be a day, a week, or a montho
A more realistic approach toward the problem is to weight the demands
according to the number of persons making that type of demand. For instance
if one hundred persons voiced a demand for type A and only twenty were
behind the demand type B, it is postulated that the political system would
suffer more stress if it failed to satisfy type A than it would have had it
failed to satisfy typ^B. That is, the political system would be "punished"
more for ignoring or for failing to satisfy type A. It is assumed here that each
individual can only express one type of demand during the time interval in
question. This frees us from the problem of overlapping demands.
To account for this weighting one method is to consider the total
number of demands to be equal to the total number of persons voicing these
24
demands. That is, if one hundred persons make a demand of type A, then
this will be considered as one hundred demands of type A. Simarilarly, a
satisfying decision would be one which satisfied one person. To illustrate,
assume four demands were made during some time period, and that each of
these four represented a different type. Let the number of persons making
each demand be denoted in Table I
TABLE I





The total volume of demands would be the sum of the right hand
column, which, in this case, is 290. Now assume the political system
made decisions which satisfied demand types 1 and 3 only. In this case
the total number of satisfying decisions would be 150. The rate of stress
would be proportional to the difference, 290 - 150, or 140. If the political
system had satisfied types 1 and 4 instead, the difference would have been
180 which represents a higher rate of stress. Generalizing, let,
P^ = number of persons asking ith type of demand
Then
j^
= (1 if ith demand satisfied)
(0, otherwise)
D
D = E Pi (II
i=l
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where D is the total number of different type demands and D is the total
number of individual demands, where individual demands are defined above.
Let Dg be the total number of satisfying decisions as defined earlier. Then
Dg = 21 ^i P. (Ill
^ i=l ' ^
The rate of stress weighted due to the above argument can now be expressed
as
-^ = B (D - DJ (12)
Dt ^
For simplicity, the remaining portion of this thesis will consider stress
only as a function of demands and decisions by type.
The purpose of this section was to show how demands may be a con-
tributing factor to the stress acting on a political system. For any unit
time interval, it was shown that the rate of stress was proportional to the
difference between demands and satisfying decisions. From this argument
it is seen that any means of increasing satisfying decisions relative to
demands would be advantagbuss to the political system. Some of the factors
which affect satisfying decisions will now be studied in more detail. In
analyzing these methods of increasing effective decisions, a probabalistic
approach will be followed whereby the number of satisfying decisions eman-
ating from the political system over some unit time interval will be expres-
sed in terms of expected numbers of satisfying decisions. The two concepts




As mentioned in section 3. 1 the communications system is directly
responsible for the passing of information through the boundaries of society
and the political system. Up to this point we have assumed perfect com-
munication - this is, all demands have reached the political system and
all decisions have reached the society. Furthermore, such information was
assumed to have passed the boundaries undistorted. An analytical method
is now proposed by which the effect of communication may be taken into ^.
account. To better understand the system it will be helpful to refer to





















SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (MODIFIED)
INCLUDING COMMUNICATIONS
Referring to Figure 5, demands and decisions pass through a "black
27
box" called communications. Within the communications system demands
and decisions are converted to communicated demands and decisions re-
spectively. The dashed lines indicate that the communications system is
actually a part of the boundaries of society and of the political system.
Now suppose it is possible to determine the probability that a demand is
successfully communicated to the political system, and that it is further
possible to determine the probability that a decision is successfully com-
municated to the people. If one accepts this, it is then possible to talk
of the expected number of satisfying decisions with respect to the demands
generated. Using the expected number of satisfying decisions it is possible
to gain some insight into how the stress rate might behave with respect to
communications ability. It should be mentioned here that society is not
aware of the loss of certain demands through communications and thus
assumes that all demands reach the political system. Symbolically:
D = total number of demands by type general ed by society
during some given time interval.
D^ = expected number of demands which are communicated
to the political system.
D' = expected number of satisfying decisions made by
political system (these decisions have not yet been communicated).
^cs ~ expected number of satisfying decisions which are
communicated to the people.
?^ = probability that a demand is communicated to the
political system.
28
P' = probability that a satisfying decision is communicated





D^ = P^ D (13)
Dcs = Pc °k (14)
To see the possible effects of communications on the rate of stress
substitute equation (14) for D in equation (3) yielding
^ = B(D-D^,) (15)
To illustrate the effects of communications on the rate of stress
consider the following example. Suppose that within a specific time frame
society voices six types of demands. Assume that all demands which had
been made previous to the time frame in question were satisfied so that
there are no demands carried over.
Thus D = 6
First/ it will be assumed that perfect communication exists - that is
P = P' = 1
^c '^c ^
Then
Dcs = D = 6
Now suppose that the probability that decision will satisfy the demand is
. 8-then
^s = Ps Dc = 4.
8
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and since, perfect communications is assumed, it is seen that
D = D' = 4.8cs s ^' °
Based on this expected number of satisfying decisions which are
communicated to the people, the stress rate would be expected to increase
by an amount proportional to D - D^g = 1.2. Now this stress rate will be
compared with that resulting from imperfect communications.
Suppose the probability that a demand is communicated to the political
system is . 6. Then
and
D^ = P^D = 3.6
D' = P D =2.9
s s c
Assuming P' = . 8
^cs = ^c ^k " -^ ^2.9) = 2.3
From this it is seen that the stress rate is now proportional to D - D^g =
6-2.3 = 3.7. This is more than three times as much as that for perfect
communications! Communications, then, plays an important role in control-
ling the rate of stress.
3.3 Complexity o
The second factor affecting satisfying decisions to be considered is
that of complexity. As mentioned in 3.1, complexity is related to how the
decision making processes are sub-divided within the political system.
Eisenstadt states that the "variety of political demands. . . which the (polit-
30
ical) system can absorb increases "25 the more a political system is dif-
ferentiatedo Based on this assertion, it is postulated that the more dif-
ferentiation or complexity there is within the political system the more cap-
ability that system will have in making satisfying decisions. For purposes
of analysis complexity will be defined in terms of the number of sections
within the political system. These sections may consist of one individual
or several. The actual physical make-up of these sections is not of import-
ance here. Further, each section is assumed to "specialize" or to be an "a
"authority" on certain types of decisions. For example, a transportation
system is considered to specialize in transportation problems, the educa-
tion section with education decisions, and so on. Since these sections do
specialize in specific decisions, it is postulated that if a certain type of
demand is processed through a section which specialized in that type of
demand, the resulting decision has a far greater chance of satisfying those
who initiated the demand than a decision which would have resulted from
other sections. It is assumed that when a demand of a certain type enters
the political system it is assigned to the section which specializes in that
type of demand. If no such section exists, it is assumed that the demand
is than directed to a general section where it is processed with a lesser
chance of being satisfied. This idea is illustrated in Figure 6.
^^Eisenstadt, S. N. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Bureaucracy
and Political Development , ed. LaPalombara. Princeton University Press,
1963. p. 97.
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SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (MODIFIED)
INCLUDING COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPLEXITY
For illustrative reasons, the communicated demands have been divided
into four components. The first three demands are assigned to their respect-
ive sections while all "other" demands are assigned to the general section.
Within each section the particular demand or demands are processed into
decisions. At point A the decisions ^ coming from the specialized sections
are summed and assigned an overall probability of satisfaction. This sum
yields an expected number of satisfying decisions coming from specialized
sections represented by Dg. Within the general section; all decisions are
also summed and assigned an overall [probability of satisfaction which gives
an expected number of satisfying decisions resulting from non specialized
32
A
sources o This is represented by Dg. This analysis will now be presented
symbolically.
Let C^ = number of sections into which political system is divided.
S. = section specialized in j th type of demand.
•^ci ~ communicated demand of i th, typeo
D^ = total number of communicated demands by type.
A
tions.
D = total number of decisions coming from specialized sec-
A
P = probability that decisions coming from specialized
sections will be satisfying.
K
P = probability that decisions coming from non-specialized
sections will be satisfying.
A
Dg = expected number of satisfying decisions coming from
specialized sources.
Dg = expected number of satisfying decisions coming from
non-specialized sources.
Dg = expected number of satisfying decisions coming from
the political system.
Now Dg can be determined from the following relationship;
Ds = £ 21 Sj Di
j=l i=l
where
^i % =( 1 if i=j " that is, if there exists a section which
specializes in type i demands
0, otherwise
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From Figure 6 it is seen that
K A
I^s = D^ - Ds (17)
Then
A ' A A
a' ^ a
D3 = PD3 (19)
A ' ^
and D^ = Dg + D^ (20)
To clarify some of these points consider the following example.
Suppose five types of demands are successfully communicated to the polit-
ical system. Suppose the system has sections which specialize in only
three types of these demands. Let these sections be numbered 1, 2 and 3
respectively, and let the type demands corresponding to these sections be
numbered in the same manner. For instance^ if the sections specialized in






If the demands were concerned with labor, health, voting rights, education








From this information it is seen that
and
D3 = S^ D^ -H S2 D2 + S3 D3 = 3
A
Now assume that the probability that decisions coming from specialized
sections will be satisfactory is .8, while the probability concerning decis-
ions coming from non-specialized sections is . 4. This yields
A' AA
and
Dg = P Dg = (.8)(3) =2.4
D' = P D^ = (.4)(2) = .8
and
A X"/
D^ = D^ + Dg = 2.4+ .8 =3.2
Thus from an input of 5 demands, 3. 2 of these can be expected to be satis-
fying if perfect communication is assumed. If all 5 demands were processed
by the non-specialized sources only (. 4) (5) = 2 satisfying decisions could
be expected. This analysis offers some idea of how complexity aids the
political system in its attempt to issue satisfying decisions.
3o 4 External Forces.
In this part of the thesis the concepts described in the previous sec-









POLITICAL°4 = Pc ?
'
1



















SOCIETY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (MODIFIED) WITH
THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTERNAL FORCES
36
of the political system. Further, it is now postulated that forces external
to society and the political system are free to act upon the political systemo
Such external forces might include^ for example, international crises, flood,
famine, or war. The affect of these external forces on the ability of the
political system to issue satisfying decisions will be analyzed. Figure 7 is
the flow diagram which will be followed in the analysis <= For simplicity,
the complexity portion of the political system is not shown in the diagram.
It is now postulated that the level of demands which the society issues
is directly proportional to the level of stress that exists. That is, the more
stress an individual feels the more demands he will make in order to attempt
to alleviate this stress. Thus
D(t) = ^S(t) ^>-0 (20)
from which it follows that
dD(t) ^ p ,JBM (21)
dt \ dt
and
^2i^ = fBfD(t) -D(t)l (22)
•dt \ L cs J
and, rewriting,
^^ = f B[D(t)
- BD^g(t)] (23)
For simplicity it is assumed that at time t = 0, no demands or decisions are
present in the system. That is D(0) = Dj-.g(0) = 0. Now, using laplace
transforms, it is seen that
SD(s) - ^BD(s) = - ^BD^g(s) (24)
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from which
D(s) = \ ^"\' (25)
Referring to section 3.2, it is seen that communicated satisfying decisions
are directly related, through a series of prcfcabilities, to initial demands.
That is
Dc = P^D (26)
and from equations (17), (18), (19), and (20) it can be seen that
Dg + Dg = Dc (27)
and
A A A A I
P Dg + P Dg = Dg = P' D^, (28)
where P' represents the probability that a communicated demand will be
satisfactorily answered within the entire political system. Finally, from
equation (14)
D = P' D' (29)
cs c s ^ '
Thus, combining equations (26), (28), and (29) yields
Dcs = Pc P' Pc D (30)
For convenience, let
P = P^ P' Pc (31)
which leaves
Dcs = P D (32)
As mentioned earlier external forces are to be considered in this
section. For simplicity, it is assumed that satisfying decisions is some
linear function of these external forces. Therefore, the external forces.
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denoted by E[tl, may be introducted into equation (32) to give
Dcs(t) = PD(t) + E[t\ (33)
Applying laplace transforms to this equation yields
D^g(s) = PD(s) + E[s] (34)
Substituting equation (25) in equation (34) yields
Dcs(s) = Pfl^l^^j - HA (35)
Rearranging,
S Dcs(s) - C B D^^(s} + P ^ B Des,(s) ^ ^ r j (36)
and
D^ rs) = rs
- f b] Efs]
^^
s - f B+ P 5 B
Letting K = fB-Pf B •— (38)
equation (37) may now be written as
D,3(s)=t^f^^ (39)
Thus the laplace transform of D (t) is now expressed only as a
function of the laplace transform of E[t]. By assuming E[t] to behave in a
certain manner, it can be determined how this behavior affects the expected
number of satisfying decisions. To illustrate, assume that the level of
external forces suddenly jumps to some level E at time t = tQ. That is,
E(t) behaves as shown in Figure 8. This might be the case where a neigboring
society suddenly overthrows its government imposing certain external forces





EXTERNAL FORCES - SUDDEN RISE
Now the laplace transform for this function is
E[s] = E e~^^o
s
Substituting that into equation (39) yields
-sto
n (s) =




Now the final value of D^g(t) may be found by the laplace transformation
to,be




li:mD(t^ = lim fs - < b1 Je" ^
t-> "O s-»0 s-K
which yields a final value for Dj^g(t| of
lim D__ t = -^-^^CS Y
t-^«* *^




llm D (t^ = ^ (45)
Notice that the expected number of satisfying decisions, after the crises
had occurred, reaches a steady state value proportional to the level of the
crises. Further, the proportionality constant, g
,
gets larger as P
increases. That is, as the communications system performs better and as
the bureaucratic structure becomes more specialized the expected number
of satisfying decisions increases. If P = 1, the steady state value for
D^^g(t) is undefined. This is not unreasonable when we consider that for
P = 1, the communications and complexity systems must be absolutely
perfect. In the real world, this is hardly plausible.
From equation (32) it is seen that
^csW = Pd[sJ (46)
Substituting this in equation (39) yields
^^^^
P [s - K] (47)
and using the same external force function, equation (47) becomes
_
Ls : e B] Ee^-^^o (48)
Applying the laplace final value theorem, it is seen that
lim D(t) = f B £ = e"_
t-^oo PK P[l-Pj
Here it is seen that the steady state value for the number of demands gen-
erated from society is also proportional to the level of external forces. It
is interesting to note that the steady state value for the number of demands
reaches its minimum value when P —>. 5 while steady state value of the
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expected number of satisfying decisions approaches its minimum value as
P->0. From this it might be inferred that people tend to generate more and
more demands when the probability of these demands being satisfied is loWo
As the probability of satisfaction starts to increase, the number of generated
demands becomes less. As the probability increases beyond.. 5, however,
people learn that their demands are being satisfied and therefore increase
their demands as the probability increases from . 5.
The final factor which would be effected by these external forces is
that of stress. From equation (20) it is seen that
D(s) = ^ S(s) (50)
Substituting equation (50) in equation (48), yields
c^ \ [s -_ < b1 Ee"^^o /.,vS^^^
= ^Ps>-Kj ^^^^






t-^* ^ P [l - Pj
From equation (52) it is seen that the level of stress is also directly propor-
tional to the external forces. The stress level responds to P similarly as




As another example consider the situation where the external force
level is continuously rising, as would be the case of increasing international
tension. In this case, E(t) would appear as in Figure 9, where E(t) = At.
For simplicity assume A = 1. Now the laplace transform for E(t) is




EXTERNAL FORCE - STEADY RISE
Substituting this in equation (39) yields
Applying the final value theorem it is seen that
lim D^gW > *>^ (55)
t-9-o
That is, as the external forces get extremely large, the expected number of
satisfying decisions becomes undefined. From the preceeding analysis
it is seen that a similar argument holds for demands and stress. From this,
it may be inferred that as the external forces becomes large, the very exist-
ence of the political system and society is doubtful.
3. 5 External Forces - Lag Time.
In the previous section it was assumed that the current level of
demands was proportional to the current level of stress. It is now postulated
that the current level of demands depends upon not only the present stress
level, but also on previous stress levels. For convenience it is assumed
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that the past levels of stress are weighted exponentially as shown in










if the current level of demands were proportional to the level of stress'T'time
units in the past.





The term, T s + 1, is also known as a first order time lag.
Another way of looking at this problem is to consider the idea of a
marginal demand, or the next demand generated. This marginal demand is
assumed to be proportional to both the current level of stress and the current
level of demands. Symbolically,
^




where the proportionality constant, l/f , is represented in a manner such
that its meaning relative to the previous interpretation is clear. To better
understand this idea consider the following example. If, for a given stress
level, the current level of demands is high, the propensity to generate one
more demand is quite low, while if the current level of demands is low, the
propensity would be much greater. It can be shown that the laplace trans-
form of equation (57) is identical with equation (56).
In order to express the i^place transform of demands in tanns of the
laplace transform of the expected number of satisfying decisions it is con-
venient to proceed as follows. Recall that
dt
Equation (58) may be expressed in terms of Laplace transforms as
S(s) = I [d(s)
- D^g(s)j (59)
Substituting this expression into equation (56) and rearranging, yields
^^
f" "
B[D(t) - D^3(t)J (58)
DCs) = -
^.bPcs^^)
Now it is also assumed that marginal demands are also dependent on the
present level of satisfying decisions. From an argument similar to the one
leading to equation (57), it is possible to express marginal demands in tifttms
of the expected number of satisfying decisions as
(61)f^ = 4; [dcsW - P D(t)
where T^ represents the time leg between decisions and demands. Rearrang-
ing equation (61) yields
Dcs(t) = P D(t) + ^1^ , (62)
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Including the external forces, equation (62) may be expressed as
Dcs(t) = P D(t) + r^^ + E(t) (63)
Taking the Uplace transform of both sides of equation (63) yields
Dcs(s) = P DCs) + s T^ D(s) + E(s) (64)
Rearranging
Dcs(s) = D(s) (P+ sT^) + E(s) (65)
Substituting equation (60) in equation (65) yields
/ X
- f B^cs(sHp+ sT iI
Dcs(s) = sCTs+D- ^B + E(s) (66)
Rearranging it is seen that
n u) - (s^T + s - g B| E(s) ,Dcs^s; - g2r + s - f B + ^ BP + ^Bs T^
^^^^
Again, assuming external forces behave as shown in Figure 8, the Idplace
transform for E(t) is
s
^
Substituting this in equation (67) yields
E(s) = f e-sto (68)
D (s) = E(s2r -hs - (B)e-sto (69)
^s s(s2r + s - ^ B+ ^B?-^ fBs^i)
Applying the l^place final value theorem it can be shown that
lim D(t) = - fBE ^ E
^
t-?>«x» -^B+^BP 1-P
Taking the laplace transform of equation (62) yields
Dcs(s) = PD(s| + sTi D(s) = D(s)(P+sr^), (71)
Substituting this in equation (69) yields
D(s) = (s^r + s - jB) Ee-stp ^_
^^ (s2r + s - (B> fBP+^-BsT^(P " sTi)(s)
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Applying the laplace final value theorem
lim D(t) = - ^B£
(73)t-^ «^ (- ^ B + ^ BP) P . jP (1 - P)
Finally, substituting equation (56) into equation (72) and rearranging yields
c(.) = (IH- sT)(s^T + s
-f B)|e-s^ (74)
f (s2r + s--^B+ ^BP+ ^BsTiKP - s r^)(s)
and from the Laplace final value theorem
limS(t) = - f B E , ^ ^ _ E _ (75)
t-^9» P(-^B+^BP)P ^ P (1 - P)
Now, assuming external forces behave as shown in Figure 9,, the laplace
transform of E(t) is
E(s) = l/s2 (76)
Substituting this into equation (67) and applying the laplace final value
theorem it can be shown that
Dcs(t) 9 «^
limt-9o<a (77)
That is, the expected number of satisfying decisions is undefined in the
limit. Similarly it can be shown that stress and demands behave in the
same way as t is allowed to approach infinity.
From the ar^lytical techniques employed it is seen that the steady
state values for stress, number of demands and expected number of satisfy-
ing decisions is not affected by the introduction of lag time into the systemo
That is, in the long run the behavior of the people and of the political system
is not related to any lags which may be present. However, lags are the
important element in the short run analysis.
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4. Summary and Conclusions.
In this thesis the methodology of systems analysis is used in order
to better understand the complex interactions involved in the area of poli-
tics o Primarily, the interactions considered were those involved with de-
mands and decisions in response to those demands. The analysis then
followed on the premise that any factor which would increase the political
system's ability to successfully satisfy demands would be beneficial to the
political system in that a reduction in stress would foUoWo Finally, the
effect of forces external to the political system and society were investi-
gated.
In concluding it is felt that the methodology used in this thesis is
beneficial toward understanding some of the factors which can increase or
decrease the chances of a political system remaining viable inder certain
conditions. Although the success or failure of a political system is based
primarily on its ability to successfully answer demands, other criteria came
to mind during the writing of this thesis.
Perhaps one of the most important factors which should be investigated
is the ability of the political system to issue demands which would success-
fully lead the society toward certain goals. The problem becomes much more
complex here when one considers that such decisions might not be at all
satisfying to the members of the society. People would accept or reject
such decisions based on the amount of "trust" they had in the political
system. Also the enforcement required to back such decisions would have
to be considered. It is felt, however, that these seemingly complex con-
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siderations can be studied analytically through techniques similar to those
used in this thesis.
Another factor which should be taken into account is that of the
economic situation and its relationship with the political system. For
example, if the people are demanding resources which are scarce, the poli-
tical system must find some way to effectively answer these demands. In-
herent in this argument might be the political system's response to certain
foreign aid possibilities.
Generally, systems analysis offers a method of reducing highly
complicated concepts into terms which are understandable.
That such an approach offers any final answers is unknown, but it
represents one of the few methods for analyzing highly complex interrelated
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